Introduction
On May 2 and May 3, 2016, Dr. Catherine Kelleher of the University of Maryland, College Park, and Dr. Judith Reppy of Cornell University, hosted a conference at the Cosmos Club in Washington, D.C., as part of their MacArthur Foundation-funded grant on strategic stability at lower numbers of nuclear weapons. This conference focused on strategic stability in South Asia and what the implications of lower numbers of nuclear weapons might mean for regional stability and the world nuclear order. The conference participants included scholars and South Asia experts from around the world, including India, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy. In order to facilitate a more open dialogue, this conference report will not attribute any remarks to a particular individual, per Chatham House rules.

Dinner Speaker’s Remarks
The conference began with a dinner and featured a guest speaker with experience in both academia and government. The speaker’s remarks focused on the prospects for lower numbers of nuclear weapons, both worldwide and in South Asia, and the potential stability concerns that might arise from dramatic reductions in nuclear weapons stockpiles around the globe. To assess what might happen in the nuclear realm over the next four to eight years under the next U.S. president, the speaker harkened back to the progress made under the current administration, which might prove illustrative. In April of 2009, Barack Obama delivered the Prague Speech that committed the United States to work towards a world without nuclear weapons, and there has been progress on a number of intermediate goals, but not all. The focus of the speech was on nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.

The world has been reasonably successful in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons over the last 70 years and extremely successful in preventing the use of nuclear weapons since they were used during World War II. But it is not realistic to expect the same success over the next 70 years. At some point, the dynamic of nuclear possession but non-use will come to an end. We will either have a world where additional countries possess nuclear weapons and they are occasionally used, or a world in which no nation has nuclear weapons. It is simply unrealistic to expect that nuclear possession can be sustained without nuclear weapons ever being used forever.

Threatening the record of the last 70 years even further is the proliferation of technology that will make acquiring nuclear weapons easier, for countries and also for non-state actors. Getting states to agree to additional restraints to limit the proliferation of these technologies will require that the nuclear weapons states make more progress on disarmament, not just pay lip service to the commitment to disarmament required by the NPT. Because of this, the speaker believes that the Obama administration set the correct objectives with the Prague Speech.

After the speech the Obama administration began to make progress on the speech’s vision. The New START Treaty was signed and ratified, reducing the nuclear stockpiles of both the United States and Russia. A new Nuclear Posture Review was released that committed the United States
to avoid developing new nuclear weapons and capabilities. Negative security assurances were
strengthened. A robust effort was launched to conduct research on verification technologies and
capabilities with the goal of enabling further reductions. A series of nuclear summits were held
and large amounts of nuclear material were removed from over 30 countries. And most recently,
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was signed with Iran. These accomplishments over the
last seven years have been significant, and a future president can build upon this progress and
move closer towards the vision spelled out in the Prague Speech.

At the same time, the United States has embarked on a massive modernization program that will
replace every leg of the nuclear triad at a cost of roughly $1 trillion over the next 30 years. Under
the current requirements—how the military envisions using nuclear weapons, which are heavily
influenced by the laws of war—the size of the arsenal is about as low as it can go for the time
being. The United States is unlikely to make further cuts unilaterally, and further bilateral cuts
with Russia are not currently possible given Russia’s deep paranoia of the United States,
which causes it to rely on nuclear weapons and a destabilizing nuclear doctrine. If tensions with Russia
continue as they are today, it is possible that some of the work already made towards the Prague
Speech vision will be undone, and the United States and Russia could enter into a costly new
arms race. In order for the situation to become more conducive to deeper reductions, ultimately
Russia will have to give up its desire for special status—something it is unlikely to do in the near
future.

China is moving towards a larger and more survivable nuclear force of mobile ICBMs and
submarines, though as long as China remains committed to minimum deterrence, moving to a
more survivable force may actually be good for stability. To prevent a Chinese shift away from
minimum deterrence, the United States should convey to China that the United States accepts
mutual vulnerability, and will not try to degrade China’s strategic deterrent with missile defenses
or other capabilities.

All of these developments are taking place in an environment of rapid technological change, with
dangerous technologies becoming easier and easier to acquire. At the same time, sensing will
continue to improve, making it harder and harder to hide or conceal nefarious activities. It is
unclear how this technological conundrum will be resolved.

Discussion

According to one participant, there are two ways that, historically, weapons have disappeared.
The first is that a deadlier weapon comes about; the second is that they become unaffordable.
There may be additional countries that seek nuclear weapons and will soon be able to acquire
them, but will they be able to maintain them, given the cost?

The speaker said that the answer depends on whether a state prioritizes the maintenance of its
nuclear weapons over other necessities. Currently, Russia is prioritizing its nuclear arsenal over
economic development. Nuclear weapons maintenance is expensive, but larger states or states
that do not have to be as responsive to the needs of the population can likely sustain their nuclear
forces.

Another participant asked how vulnerable submarines and mobile missiles might be in the future
given the improvements in sensors that can be expected over the coming years.

The speaker said that currently satellites can identify mobile missiles if they are out in the open
during the day, but will have trouble if they are deployed at night. However, other technologies

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might make locating and targeting mobile missiles easier in the future. Submarines have a better chance of remaining undetectable by satellites because of how big and deep the oceans are. Submarines will likely face a greater threat from ocean-based sensors and autonomous vehicles than from satellite detection.

The next participant asked about changing the norms to delegitimize not just nuclear use but also nuclear possession. Does changing the norms about nuclear possession ever enter into the discussion in government circles, or is the discussion in government constrained by the parameters of past debates?

The speaker said that the discussion about norms focuses mainly on the laws of war, which is part of the reason why the United States has such a large arsenal of nuclear weapons. The laws of war require that any munition be targeted against a legitimate military objective, which drives the military to require hundreds of weapons instead of just a few for minimum deterrence.

Another attendee asked what the most immediate threat emanating from South Asia was in the eyes of the United States.

The speaker responded that the United States does not face a direct threat from South Asia, but the United States has an interest in preventing escalation or nuclear use anywhere in the world. The largest threat emanating from South Asia is the way that both Pakistan and India think about nuclear weapons. Pakistan thinks that its possession of nuclear weapons enables it to conduct asymmetrical or conventional attacks against India without fear of escalation or retaliation, while India believes that it must respond to large Pakistani provocations but believes that Pakistan won’t escalate to nuclear use because of its own nuclear arsenal.

**Session 1: Nuclear Learning**

*Remarks by Speaker 1*

The first speaker’s remarks began with an overview of India and Pakistan’s respective nuclear doctrines. What is known about India’s nuclear doctrine comes from a 2003 policy statement that discloses parts of India’s nuclear doctrine. First and foremost, India believes in a credible minimum deterrence posture, and has committed to a watered down no-first-use policy—it will only use nuclear weapons in response to WMD use by another nation. Its nuclear weapons are primarily under civilian control. India will soon have a nuclear triad.

Less is known about Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine. From various policy statements, experts can glean the following: Pakistan believes in credible minimum deterrence; its nuclear weapons are primarily controlled by the military; it does not have a no-first-use policy; and it envisions using tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield, potentially even in response to a conventional attack. A prominent Pakistani general has indicated that Pakistan would use nuclear weapons under the following scenarios: if India conquers large parts of Pakistan; if India destroys the Pakistani army or air force; if India strangles Pakistan economically; or if India destabilizes Pakistan politically.

Nuclear learning is the changing of one’s beliefs about nuclear deterrence, the change in the degree of confidence in one’s beliefs about nuclear deterrence, and/or the development of new beliefs about nuclear deterrence that result from observations and the interpretation of experiences. This can lead to different actors learning different lessons from the same events, or
learning incorrect lessons from past experiences. India and Pakistan “learned” from their 1999 Kargil War that conventional wars could be fought under the nuclear umbrella without guaranteed escalation to nuclear use. Pakistan also learned that asymmetric warfare against India is useful, but does not appear to have learned that it could cause escalation that might increase the risk of nuclear war.

Despite these problems, stability at lower numbers may actually be achievable in South Asia because credible minimum deterrence is already the accepted nuclear doctrine of both states. There has, so far, not been an arms race to achieve nuclear superiority in South Asia.

Remarks by Speaker 2

Pakistan and India both claim to already be at low number of nuclear weapons and believe their nuclear relationship is relatively stable. Neither country believes it is their responsibility to work towards global nuclear disarmament because, they would argue, their stockpiles are already as small as they can be. They also believe that the NPT framework is hypocritical, and the official nuclear weapons states should take the lead in promoting a nuclear-free world. Both countries learned from the U.S.-USSR experience during the Cold War that nuclear deterrence actually works and has strategic benefits.

Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine stems from its insecurity vis-à-vis India. Even before Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons, it sought to maintain nuclear ambiguity to pressure the United States into arms sales to counter India’s conventional superiority.

The international community would like India and Pakistan to learn from the U.S.-USSR experience during the Cold War, namely that deterrence is not fail-proof and that peace is possible. However, both countries believe that their nuclear relationship is unique because of their shared history and geography. If the international community wants to integrate India and Pakistan into the world nuclear order, it must understand that each country has different inputs that shape their nuclear behavior. Different approaches will be needed for each country. Furthermore, given the much larger size of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, the onus for deep reductions lies with the United States and Russia, not with India and Pakistan.

Remarks by Speaker 3

Nuclear learning involves drawing lessons from the past. But the nuclear era was born relatively recently. Therefore, how much of the past prior to the advent of nuclear weapons is relevant for nuclear learning? Given that the nuclear past is only 70 years old, how much should thoughts about the future inform nuclear learning? It is clear that even the lessons we draw from the past are informed by possible nuclear futures. It is important to recognize this dynamic when thinking about nuclear learning because it forces a discussion about the boundaries of the future, boundaries that the conventional wisdom assumes to be set.

The speaker provided five cautionary notes that should be kept in mind when thinking about nuclear learning. First, learning does not always mean learning the correct lesson. In South Asia, the learning that has occurred has been dysfunctional and hawkish. Thus, nuclear learning is not always positive.

Second, we must not assume the unanimity of learning, even when the parties in the learning process agree on the facts. For example, the French agree that the Cuban Missile Crisis is the closest the world came to nuclear war, but do not appear to have been worried during the crisis. Therefore, we might want to try to learn from things that have not yet happened as well.
Third, how will we know when we’ve learned enough from an experience? Who decides when the lessons from an event have been learned? There is currently overconfidence in the sufficiency of learning from past crises.

Fourth, there is a difference between nuclear learning and nuclear wisdom. However, in practice, this distinction often does not trickle down into actual policy recommendations.

Fifth, most of the learning that takes place accepts the existing frameworks for thinking about nuclear weapons, including strategic stability, arms control, and deterrence. We are learning to enable us to live with nuclear weapons.

Discussion

The first comment questioned the accuracy of the history presented during the speaker remarks. Pakistan did not pursue its nuclear program in response to India’s nuclear program; in fact, Pakistan began thinking about a nuclear program in 1965. Pakistan and India do not have equal incentives or equal interests. Any regional regime would require acknowledging the truth about why each state behaves the way that it does and ending the false legitimacy between the two states’ claims and positions. Pakistan uses its nuclear weapons to compel the United States to intervene in a conflict cycle that Pakistan starts, forcing India not to respond to Pakistani provocations. If Pakistan avoided these provocations, there would be far less instability on the subcontinent. As long as this dynamic persists, Pakistan will not have an incentive to change its behavior.

The first speaker responded that it is true that Pakistan and India do not have equal incentives or positions, but harping on this fact will not help India move forward. Ultimately, India has no choice but to engage with Pakistan and accept Pakistan’s asymmetric advantage because the risks of escalation are too great. The second speaker agreed with the questioner’s comments on Pakistan’s nuclear history and reading of Pakistan’s incentive structure. Pakistan’s positions are hypocritical. But Pakistan’s hypocritical positions have served its national interest. They legitimize the Pakistani military’s position in Pakistan and the rent-seeking strategy with the United States.

The next participant asked what exactly is meant by the phrase “nuclear order.” Does this only encompass nuclear weapons and doctrines, or does it encompass norms and institutions? And what is the relationship between the nuclear order and world order?

Another participant asked which people or organizations within the Indian and Pakistani governments are doing the learning.

The second speaker responded that India and Pakistan are not unitary actors, and in Pakistan’s case, most of the learning is done by the military. Nuclear issues are not discussed in the open, and there is little input from the population. This makes it difficult for scholars to assess who is doing the learning in Pakistan. There is also a discrepancy in Pakistan’s outlook on nuclear weapons. On the one hand, Pakistan views its nuclear relationship as exceptional because of the unique history between India and Pakistan and their close proximity. But on the other hand, most scholarship on nuclear issues uses the U.S.-USSR dyad as a reference point and draws heavily from the Cold War experience.

Another attendee mentioned that neither India nor Pakistan were particularly helpful with the sanctions regime set up for Iran, and asked why that might be.
The second speaker responded that Pakistan has actually been fairly supportive of the Iran nuclear deal because it does not wish to see a nuclear-armed Iran—it does not want another nuclear state on its border.

Session 2: Complex Deterrence

Remarks by Speaker 1

The speaker’s remarks began by saying that Southern Asia (a term the speaker preferred over South Asia because it allows for the inclusion of countries other than India and Pakistan) is unique because of the geographical proximity of the countries in the region. There are border disputes between the countries of Southern Asia that have caused wars in the past—a feature that did not exist between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. India, Pakistan, and China are all currently expanding and modernizing their nuclear arsenals and delivery systems, including the introduction of solid fuel missiles, which shorten response times. India, Pakistan, and China are all planning to create a triad by building a submarine-based missile force. All of this is happening in parallel with conventional military modernization and expansion, including the introduction of new and potentially destabilizing weapons like anti-ship ballistic missiles and missile defenses.

The modernization taking place in the region is interconnected by the bilateral relationships between the United States and China, China and India, and India and Pakistan. Actions taken by the United States influence China’s modernization, which in turn influence India’s strategic calculus, which goes on to spark reactions from Pakistan. The complexity of this dynamic makes it difficult to make predictions about stability.

Pakistan is focusing on building battlefield nuclear weapons like the Nasr short-range ballistic missile in order to deter conventional conflict with India, in part to enable it to continue its support for Jihadi terrorists without risking a conventional response from India. This strategy, similar to China’s anti-access area denial (A2/AD) strategy, shifts the onus of escalation onto the larger actor. However, Pakistan has not demonstrated the capability of the Nasr through testing, raising suspicion about whether the Nasr can actually carry a nuclear warhead.

Despite the fact that wars have been fought in the past and that India, Pakistan, and China are all embarking on nuclear modernization programs to bolster their nuclear strategies, there has so far been no attempt by the countries of the region to come to a common understanding of the role that nuclear weapons play in deterring conflict between them. This lack of common understanding is made worse by the uncertainty that each country has about the other’s intentions and capabilities. This is a recipe for misinterpretation and miscalculation.

Remarks by Speaker 2

The speaker began by stating that nuclear institutions largely mirror the global world order. When the international system changes, it allows for changes in the realm of deterrence. The international system and the nuclear order interact with each other in complex ways, but it is clear that one cannot think about regional deterrence without thinking about the global nuclear order and the international system that interacts with it.

The speaker remarked that while traveling in East Asia, news of the U.S. consideration of deploying THAAD to South Korea had traveled throughout the region within a day. In today’s
world, regional dialogues can easily become global dialogues because news and information travels so fast. Regional discussions are no longer possible without global repercussions. Thus, nations cannot know the full range of ramifications that a policy action might have.

Complex deterrence is not necessarily nuclear. There are a multitude of other emerging capabilities, from new conventional weapons to cyber capabilities, which make deterrence far more complex than in the past. Complex deterrence is also not necessarily against states. Since the George W. Bush administration, deterrence has also been employed against non-state actors. We are now in an age where conventional, cyber, space, and nuclear deterrence against both states and non-states are being woven together in unpredictable ways.

The way that the relationship between India and Pakistan is often presented is misleading. The relationship between India and Pakistan is not similar to the relationship between the superpowers during the Cold War, where both sides acknowledged the existence of a rivalry. India does not see a rivalry—it sees a security problem posed by Pakistan. There is no parity in status, at least in India’s eyes. This has implications for how each state views deterrence vis-à-vis the other.

Understanding complex deterrence will require nuclear experts to collaborate with conventional, space, and cyber experts, and vice versa. If all of these communities continue to only speak only to themselves, it will be difficult to develop new and innovative thinking.

Discussion

One participant commented that India should not doubt Pakistan’s ability to make the Nasr nuclear-capable just because it has not recently tested a plutonium device. This participant also said that Pakistan uses its nuclear weapons to force the United States into managing any crisis between Pakistan and India. Because the fact that Pakistan is a nuclear weapons state scares the United States into the conflict management role, neither Pakistan nor India have developed their own crisis management mechanisms or their own confidence building measures. Perhaps the United States should step back from the region and allow both countries to develop these tools so they can better manage their own crises.

The first speaker responded that if the Nasr’s plutonium warhead hasn’t been demonstrated through testing, Pakistan cannot be sure that India will have confidence that it has such a capability. Can Pakistan be sure that India will be deterred merely by the claim that the Nasr is nuclear-capable?

Another participant noted that British calculations on how many nuclear weapons they needed were driven not just by how many weapons they would need to deter Russia, but by how many they needed to convince the United States that they were a reliable ally. Is there a similar dynamic at play between Pakistan and China?

The second speaker responded that most nations do not believe that the United States will actually “trade Washington for Tokyo,” as the saying goes. Yet these nations do not develop their own nuclear weapons. The reason is not because they are assured by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, but because their populations will not allow them to spend the money necessary to build their own nuclear weapons.

The next participant asked if ambiguity in the nuclear relationship between India and Pakistan was actually stabilizing. If it isn’t, where would greater transparency help?
Another participant asked why Pakistan would engage in greater transparency or confidence building measures without being coerced to do so. Pakistan benefits greatly from the status quo and would have no reason to change course without being pressured. This participant also identified an asymmetry in the nuclear relationship between India and Pakistan. India often says that it cannot engage in covert or subconventional operations against Pakistan because Pakistan has nuclear weapons, while Pakistan says that they can engage in covert or subconventional operations against India precisely because they have nuclear weapons. Thus, it is Pakistan’s more reckless strategy that could cause a war and lead to nuclear escalation, not India’s strategy. The international community’s goal should be first and foremost to get Pakistan to stop using Jihadist non-state actors as the principal tool of its foreign policy, because it is this strategy that is most likely to lead to war and nuclear escalation.

The first speaker responded that it is indeed true that there is no political will to address the root cause of the problem, namely Pakistan’s reliance on non-state actors to promote its foreign policy, which leaves the international community with very few options. In order to deal with this reality, it is imperative for both India and Pakistan to get better at signaling so miscalculation and escalation does not result from the next terrorist provocation.

The second speaker responded that in addition to the asymmetry in the willingness to take risks, there is also an asymmetry in resolve which also works in Pakistan’s favor. India is simply more willing to endure attacks than Pakistan is. India is also forced to take its global prestige into account when it considers responses to Pakistani provocations—another consideration that Pakistan does not have.

Session 3: Implications for U.S. Policy

Remarks by Speaker 1

The speaker’s remarks began with an observation that if one looks at South Asia through the nuclear prism, one’s views will be defined by deterrence pessimism, which stands in contrast to the general sense of optimism that can be found among Indians and Pakistanis about the stability of their region. This must be kept in mind as policy makers from outside the region attempt to make suggestions and play a constructive role in the region’s affairs. It will be difficult to communicate ideas based on pessimism to people who do not necessarily have a pessimistic outlook.

There are four potential priorities for the United States vis-à-vis South Asia, and the next administration will have to choose which deserve the most attention, since all four cannot be addressed at the same time, at least not effectively. The first is nuclear security. Pakistan has been the focus when it comes to nuclear security in South Asia, and India has largely been given a pass. The United States should focus on both countries.

The second priority is crisis escalation. The potential exists for major inadvertent escalation, most likely from a terrorist attack against India emanating from Pakistan. The United States has so far done a poor job of investing in the creation of mechanisms that would help manage escalation in the aftermath of such an event.

The third priority is the modernization and arms race taking place in the region. New technologies and capabilities are being introduced that change the response-counter response deterrence equation in unforeseen ways.
Lastly, the role that the region plays in the global nonproliferation regime should be an issue of greater concern to the United States. This will continue to come into conflict with other geopolitical goals, such as strengthening the U.S.-India alliance to counter growing Chinese influence at the expense of greater pressure on India to abide by nonproliferation norms.

The ideal outcome for the next administration is continued stability at low numbers of nuclear weapons, the avoidance of crisis-triggering events, and enhanced adherence to nonproliferation norms. The most important short-term objective, however, should be the avoidance of crisis-triggering events and the installment of firebreaks that would slow crises should they occur. The threat of escalation to the nuclear level is real and should not be taken lightly by the U.S. government or the governments of the region.

Remarks by Speaker 2

The normal discourse around arms control and nonproliferation may no longer be useful in today’s world. Instead, it may be more effective to talk about nuclear risk reduction and the larger spectrum that such a term encompasses.

In terms of global U.S. nonproliferation objectives, there are three main priorities. The first is reducing the risk to nuclear materials in the region. This is currently done through supporting the various global nonproliferation regimes, such as the NPT, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and a number of UN resolutions. However, bringing India and Pakistan into the fold on these regimes is unlikely, so alternative methods to promote nuclear risk reduction will need to be developed.

The second global nonproliferation objective should be the limitation of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. The United States uses a complex system of export controls, nuclear cooperation agreements, and international assistance to promote this objective.

Third, the fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT) and the comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT) are longstanding U.S. objectives that would limit nuclear weapons capabilities. These two treaties would be the only way to get materials security, enrichment and reprocessing, and the South Asian arms race under control. Unfortunately, neither treaty has a realistic chance of entering into force.

With regard to South Asia specifically, the United States should focus on getting China to curtail its nuclear trade with Pakistan to limit Pakistan’s ability to improve its delivery systems and expand the size of its arsenal. This will require the United States to confront China over its blatant disregard for the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines.

Ultimately, many of the commonly discussed remedies to the problems of the region—a nuclear weapon-free zone or a bilateral arms control agreement—are not realistic. The United States should take smaller steps towards creating stability given that solutions to the fundamental problems of the region are not currently in the cards.

Discussion

A participant asked why the first speaker believes that insufficient attention has been paid to Indian nuclear security while too much attention has been paid to Pakistani nuclear security.

The first speaker responded that because nuclear weapons are so central to Pakistan’s national security, its nuclear arsenal is likely the most well-protected thing in Pakistan. There are huge incentives for Pakistan to protect its nuclear weapons, including increasing its legitimacy as a nuclear weapons state. The people who oversee Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are professional;
they take their jobs seriously. On the other hand, India has received almost no scrutiny on their nuclear security.

Another participant asked why nuclear security in South Asia was a U.S. responsibility and not a global responsibility. Why haven’t other countries taken more of a leadership role on this issue? Both the first and second speakers said that other states, particularly European states, have taken leadership roles on nuclear security in the past, but the United States is the global actor with the most influence and is often unwilling to delegate to other willing states.

The next participant asked if the United States should bear some of the blame for Pakistan’s pariah status, which has contributed to the lack of incentive Pakistan feels to be a responsible member of the international community.

The first speaker responded that Pakistan is primarily responsible for the decisions it has made and the actions it has taken that have contributed to its reputation. But the United States should help Pakistan reintegrate and become a responsible global citizen.

Another participant noted that while India remains outside of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), it has carried out more PSI-type interceptions than PSI countries. Therefore, is it PSI membership that is important, or the execution of PSI-type activities? This participant also asked what the United States might be able to do to prevent a “Mumbai II” type of event, which could lead to escalation.

The second speaker agreed that India can play a constructive role without formal PSI membership, but there is still a lot more that India can do to increase transparency and participate in global norms, especially as a nuclear weapons state. The first speaker added that India has followed the letter of many of its nonproliferation commitments, but it has fallen short on the spirit of those commitments—it has sought to water down any commitment that would align it with mainstream practices. It is important to try to bring India into the global nonproliferation regime, but any actions to bring India into the international community should not bring the global standard down.

The next participant questioned the remarks made so far about the failure of the U.S.-Indian nuclear deal. Other participants felt that the deal did little to constrain India’s nuclear developments, but this participant felt that it had. This participant agreed that India has received a free pass on nonproliferation issues, but that its nonproliferation record was also comparatively good, all things considered.

The first speaker responded that the goal of having a strategic partnership is worthy, but it should not be used to sweep all other issues of concern under the rug. The separation plan and the Additional Protocol with India were grave mistakes. The United States should not look the other way when India takes actions that are deleterious to U.S. and regional interests.